Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988) , this paper fully characterizes the class of Nashimplementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo's message space specification -s-mechanisms. This class of SCCs is further shown to be equivalent to the class of Nashimplementable SCCs, though any further 'strategy space reduction' mechanism breaks this equivalent relationship down.
Introduction
In Nash implementation theory, it is Maskin's Theorem (Maskin, 1999) which shows that when the planner faces at least three agents, a social choice correspondence (SCC) is implementable in (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria (henceforth, Nash-implementable) if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power ; conversely, any Nash-implementable SCC is Maskin-monotonic. Two issues pertaining to this theorem stand out. First, it does not provide a complete characterization of Nash-implementable SCCs, since no-veto power is not necessary for Nash implementation. Second, a canonical mechanism proposed in this theorem, which requires each agent to report a preference profile, a feasible social outcome, and an integer, is not so attractive. This is because the message space of this mechanism is rather large and announcing all other agents' preferences is undesirable in terms of the informational efficiency of decentralized decision making (on this point see, for instance, Hurwicz, 1960) . Moore and Repullo (1990) address the first issue by providing, without any domain restriction, a necessary and sufficient condition, called Condition μ, for Nash implementability of SCCs in societies with more than two agents. 1 In contrast to the first issue, the issue of informational efficiency is addressed by Saijo (1988) , who shows that a mechanism with strategy-space reduction (henceforth, s-mechanism) suffices to guarantee Maskin's Theorem. Note that, in s-mechanisms, each agent is requested to announce, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer, her own and her neighbor's preferences solely. Yet, as Moore and Repullo (1990) also use a canonical mechanism for showing the full characterization and Saijo (1988) does not discuss a full characterization of Nash implementation, it leaves unclear not only whether Moore and Repullo's result indispensably relies on canonical mechanisms but also whether s-mechanisms can Nash-implement any other SCC than Maskin-monotonic and no-veto power ones.
In this paper, we address the issue of what constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation by s-mechanisms. We introduce a class of new conditions (labelled, {Condition μ s r } r=1,...,n−2 ) which fully char- 1 Note that, for two person societies, Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991) independently provided necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation, whereas even in societies with more than two agents, there are other works on complete characterizations of Nash implementation under some domain restrictions, such as Danilov (1992) and Yamato (1992) .
acterize the class of SCCs Nash-implemantable by s-mechanisms. Each of Condition μ s r turns out to be equivalent to Condition μ. The same issue is addressed by introducing an alternative condition, Condition M s , which is similar to Condition M appeared in Sjöstrom (1991); a new characterization of Nash-implementable SCCs via s-mechansims is provided by using Condition M s . It is also shown that Condition M s is equivalent to Condition μ s r for each r = 1, . . . , n − 2 (and so to Condition μ). Moreover, we show that smechanisms constitute the 'lower-bound of Nash-implementing mechanisms' in the sense that no further strategy space reduction can preserve the Moore and Repullo (1990) full characterization of Nash implementation. It may be worth mentioning that all of our characterization results are obtained by restricting the class of available s-mechanisms to those satisfying forthrightness, which is a variation of those introduced in Dutta et al. (1995) , Saijo et al. (1996) , and Tatamitani (2001). 2 As a result, the outcome of an equilibrium message profile of our mechanisms is 'easy' to compute and the problem of information smuggling is avoided.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment. Section 3 reports our main characterization result via Condition μ s r , whereas Section 4 reports an alternative characterization result via Condition M s . Section 5 shows that the lower-bound property of s-mechanisms to reserve Nash implementation. Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
The set of (social choice) environments is (N, X, R n ), where N ≡ {1, ..., n} is a set of n ≥ 3 agents, X ≡ {x, y, z, ...} is the set of attainable alternatives (or outcomes), and R n is the set of admissible preference profiles (or states of the world). Henceforth, we assume that the cardinality of X is #X ≥ 2. Let R (X) be the set of all complete preorders on X. 3 We assume that R n ≡ R 1 × ... × R n is a non-empty subset of the n-fold Cartesian product
. An element of R n is denoted by 2 Note that the forthrightness condition is indispensable for showing Theorem 1, a main result of this paper. 3 A complete preorder R ∈ R (X) is a complete and transitive binary relation. A relation R on X is complete if, for all x, x 0 ∈ X, (x, x 0 ) ∈ R or (x 0 , x) ∈ R; transitive if, for all x, x 0 , x 00 ∈ X, if (x, x 0 ) ∈ R and (x 0 , x 00 ) ∈ R , then (x, x 00 ) ∈ R.
R ≡ (R 1 , ..., R n ), where its`-th component is R`∈ R`, for each`∈ N. For any preference profile R ∈ R n and any`∈ N, let R −`b e the list of elements of R for all agents except`, i.e., R −`≡ (R 1 , ..., R`− 1 , R`+ 1 , ..., R n ). Given a list R −`a nd R`∈ R`, we denote by (R −`, R`) the preference profile consisting of these R`and R −`. For any preference profile R ∈ R n and any S ⊆ N, let R −S be the list of elements of R for all agents in N\S. Given a list R −S and R S ∈ ×`∈ S R`, we denote by (R −S , R S ) the preference profile consisting of these R S and R −S . For any (R`, x) ∈ R`× X, agent`'s weakly lower contour set of R`at x is given by L (R`, x) ≡ {y ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ R`}. For each`∈ N and each R`∈ R`, max R`X ≡ {x ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ R`for all y ∈ X}.
We also assume that N and X are fixed throughout the following discussion, so that the set of environments is boiled down to R n . A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a correspondence F : R n ³ X with F (R) 6 = ∅ for all R ∈ R n . A mechanism (or game-form) is a pair γ ≡ (M, g), where M ≡ M 1 × ... × M n , and g : M → X is the outcome function. Denote a generic message (or strategy) for agent`by m`∈ M`and a generic message profile
, denote by (m`, m −`) the message profile consisting of these m`and m −`. For any m ∈ M and S ⊆ N, let m −S ≡ (m`)`∈ N\S . Let M −S ≡ × j∈N\S M j . Given m −S ∈ M −S and m S ∈ M S , denote by (m S , m −S ) the message profile consisting of these m S and m −S . Given R ∈ R n and γ = (M, g), the pair (γ, R) constitutes a (non-cooperative) game. Given a game (γ, R), m ∈ M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of (γ, R) if and only if, for all`∈ N, (g (m) , g (m 0`, m −`) ) ∈ R`for all m 0`∈ M`. Let NE (γ, R) denote the set of Nash equilibria of (γ, R), whereas denote the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of (γ, R) by NA (γ, R) ≡ g (NE (γ, R)).
A mechanism γ = (M, g) implements F in Nash equilibria, or simply Nash-implements F , if and only if NA (γ, R) = F (R) for all R ∈ R n . An SCC F is Nash-implementable if there is such a mechanism. Moore and Repullo (1990) show that, under the society with more than two agents, the following condition is the necessary and sufficient condition for any SCC to be Nash-implemetable.
Condition μ (for short, μ). An SCC F satisfies Condition μ if there exists a set Y ⊆ X, and for all R ∈ R n and for all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
Main Result
Following Saijo (1988), we focus on mechanisms in which each agent reports her own preference R`∈ R`, her neighbor's preference R`+ 1 ∈ R`+ 1 , an outcome x ∈ Y ⊆ X and an integer ¦ ∈ N.
In Definition 2, it is required not only that all F -optimal outcomes coincide with Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game defined by an s-mechanism for any state of the world, but also that such an s-mechanism satisfies forthrightness. It was originally introduced in economic environments by Dutta, Sen, and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamto (1996) , and it has desired implications. A mechanism satisfying forthrightness is simple in the sense that it is easy to compute the outcome of an equilibrium strategy profile. Moreover, if a mechanism fails to satisfy this condition, it is subject to information smuggling, that is, the strategy space can be reduced to an arbitrary smaller dimensional space. Thus, any Nash-implementable SCC seems to be Nash-implementable by s-mechanisms, while any SCC that is Nash-implementable by s-mechanisms seems to be Nash-implementable by a 'further strategy space reduction mechanism' like self-relevant mechanisms (Tatamitani, 2000) , unless forthrightness is requested. This indicates that without forthrightness, there is no legitimate reason for characterizing the class of Nash-implementable SCCs by s-mechanisms. Hence, forthrightness should be requested in Definition 2.
Using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990) , we now introduce a class of conditions, labelled {Condition μ s r }, to characterize Nash implementability by s-mechanisms. For each r = 1, . . . , n−2, let us introduce the following. n and all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
r for each r = 1, . . . , n − 2 if it is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism.
Proof. Let an SCC F on R n be Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism. Let γ = (M, g) be such an s-mechanism. Take any r = 1, . . . , n − 2. Define Y ≡ g (M). For all R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R), there exists an m ∈ NE (γ, R) such that g (m) = x and m`= ¡ R`, R`+ 1 , x, k`¢ for all`∈ N, by Definition 2(ii). Take any`∈ N and define
To prove sufficiency of Condition μ s r we devise a class of s-mechanims which are similar but not identical to that used by Saijo (1988) . Likely Saijo's mechanism, in our s-mechanisms agents make cyclic announcement of strategies and the preference profile, especially the deviator's preference relation, is determined without relying upon the deviator's announcement. While the proof of Saijo (1988) exploits in full the information coming from the cyclic announcement of strategies, we do not follow this course of action here as we can make use of the novelty of our Condition μ s r (iv). Proposition 2. For each r = 1, . . . , n − 2, an SCC F on R n satisfying μ s r is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism.
Proof. Let γ ≡ (M, g) be an s-mechanism. Suppose that F on R n satisfies μ s r for some r = 1, . . . , n − 2. Fix any m ∈ M, R ∈ R n , and x ∈ X, and let m`= ¡ R``, R``+ 1 , x`, k`¢ ∈ M`, where`+ 1 = 1 if`= n, and where the announcement of agent`∈ N about agent`+ 1's preferences is R``+ 1 . We say that the message profile m ∈ M is: (i) consistent with R and x if, for all`∈ N, R``= R`− 1 = R`and x`= x, where`− 1 = n if`= 1; (ii) m −i quasi-consistent with x and R, where i ∈ N, if for all`∈ N, x`= x, and for all`∈ N\{i, i + 1},
consistent with x and R, where i ∈ N, if for all`∈ N \{i}, x`= x 6 = x i , and for all`∈ N\{i, i + 1},
Define the outcome function g : M → X as follows: For any m ∈ M, Rule 1: m is consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where x ∈ F ¡R¢ , then g (m) = x. Rule 2: For some i ∈ N, m −i is quasi-consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where x ∈ F ¡R¢ , then g (m) = x. Rule 3: For some i ∈ N, m is m −i consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where x ∈ F ¡R¢ , and
Since F satisfies μ s r , it follows that, for any R ∈ R n and any x ∈ F (R), x ∈ Y . We show that γ = (M, g) Nash-implements F . Take any R ∈ R n . To show that F (R) ⊆ NA (γ, R), let x ∈ F (R) and suppose that, for all ∈ N, m`= (R`, R`+ 1 , x, ¦), where ¦ ∈ N is an arbitrary agent index. Rule 1 implies that g (m) = x. By the definition of g we have that any deviation of agent`∈ N will get her to an outcome in C`¡R −{`+1,...,`+r} , x ¢ , so that 6 If the remainder is zero the winner of the game is agent n.
, it follows that such deviations are not profitable, and so m ∈ NE (γ, R). Furthermore, this guarantees the condition of Definition 2(ii).
Conversely, to show that NA (γ, R) ⊆ F (R), let m ∈ NE (γ, R). Consider the following cases.
Case 1: m falls into Rule 1.
Then, m is consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where
Then m is m −i quasi-consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where x ∈ F ¡R¢ . Thus, g (m) = x. We proceed according the following sub-cases: 1)
As any`∈ N\ {i} can attain any y ∈ Y \ {x} by inducing Rule 4 and m ∈ NE (γ, R), we have that x ∈ max R`Y . Next, take any y
. Then the same reasoning used above for sub-case 2.1 carries over into this sub-case so that x ∈ F (R). Otherwise, let x ∈ F ¡R 0 ¢ . Then, i − 1 or i is the potential deviator. Agent ∈ N\ {i − 1, i} can attain any y ∈ Y \ {x} by inducing Rule 4 so that x ∈ max R`Y as m ∈ NE (γ, R). Consider agent i − 1. Note that, by 7 The sub-case R i i =R i and R i i+1 6 =R i+1 is not explicitly considered as it can be proved similarly to the sub-case 2.2 shown below. 
Then m is m −i consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where x ∈ F ¡R¢ . Therefore,
On the other hand, to attain x agent i can induce Rule 1 by changing
. Next, we claim that g (M`, m −`) = Y for any`∈ N\ {i}. We proceed according to whether #Y = 2 and n = 3 or not. Sub-case 3.1. not[#Y = 2 and n = 3] Take any`∈ N\ {i}. Suppose that #Y > 2. By the definition of g, we have that Y ⊆ g (M`, m −`) for any`∈ N\ {i}. Otherwise, let #Y = 2. Then, n > 3. Changing x to x`= x i , agent`can make # ©`∈ N|x`= x ª ≥ 2 and # ©`∈ N|x`6 = x ª ≥ 2. As the outcome is determined by Rule 4, agent can attain any outcome in Y by appropriately choosing k`. Therefore, Y ⊆ g (M`, m −`) for any`∈ N\ {i}. Sub-case 3.2. #Y = 2 and n = 3
Then, let N = {i − 1, i, i + 1} with i + 1 = 1 if i = n and i − 1 = n if i = 1.
We proceed according to whether for some agents`,`0 ∈ N, with`6 =`0, #R`6 = 1 and #R`0 6 = 1 or not. Sub-sub-case 3.2.1. For some`,`0 ∈ N, with`6 =`0, #R`6 = 1 and #R`0 6 = 1 In this case, agent i − 1 (resp., i + 1) can always induce the modulo game by appropriately changing the announcement of her own preference or that of her successor and by carefully choosing the outcome announcement. Finally, to attain x i , agent i − 1 (resp., i + 1) has only to adjust the integer index so that agent i becomes the winner of the modulo game. Sub-sub-case 3.2.2. For all`,`0 ∈ N, with`6 =`0, #R`= 1 or #R`0 = 1
Suppose that, for all` * ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1}, #R` * = 1. As m falls into Rule 3, it follows that x ∈ F (R) = F ¡R¢ . Otherwise, let us consider the case that, for some` * ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1}, #R` * 6 = 1. If either #R i−1 > 1 or #R i > 1, then agent i − 1 can induce the modulo game by changing m i−1 into either m *
¢ . Then, Rule 4 applies and agent i − 1 can attain x i by adjusting
, the outcome is determined by Rule 4, so that by adjusting k i−1 agent i − 1 can attain x i . By similar reasoning, it can be shown that agent i + 1 can attain
In all the above sub-cases, we obtained Y ⊆ g (M`, m −`) for all`∈ N\ {i}. As m ∈ NE (γ, R) we have that
) and g (m) ∈ max R`Y for any`∈ N\ {i}, so that g (m) ∈ F (R) by μ s r (ii). Case 4: m falls into Rule 4.
From the above propositions, we obtain the following main result. Theorem 1. An SCC F on R n is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if and only if it satisfies Condition μ s r for each r = 1, . . . , n − 2. Furthermore, we can see that the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by smechanisms is not a proper subset of the class of Nash-implementable SCCs. Lemma 1. Let F be an SCC defined on R n . Then, for each r = 1, . . . , n−2, Condition μ s r is equivalent to Condition μ.
Proof. Take any r = 1, . . . , n − 2. Let F on R n be an SCC satisfying Condition μ s r . Then, F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism via Theorem 1. Therefore, it is Nash-implementable. By Moore and Repullo (1990)'s result, it follows that F satisfies Condition μ. Conversely, let F be an SCC satisfying Condition μ. For any`∈ N, R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R), define the set C`¡R −{`+1,...,`+k} , x ¢ as follows
(2) We prove that F satisfies μ s r . Let Y = g (M). Moreover, take any R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R). It follows from (2) and μ that, for each`
, and so μ s r (iii) is met. We conclude that F satisfies μ s r if it satisfies μ.
From Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, the following corollaries are easily obtained.
n is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if and only if it is Nash-implementable.
Corollary 2. An SCC F on R n is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism if and only if it satisfies Condition μ.
Note that we can also show that for any intermediate strategy space reduction mechanism between the canonical and the s-mechanisms, Nash implementation by such an intermediate one is equivalent to Nash implementation. Indeed, let us consider any intermediate strategy space reduction mechanism, say q-mechanism, with the strategy space M`≡ R`×R`+ 1 ×. . .×R`+ q ×Y ×N for all`∈ N, where q = 2, . . . , n − 2.
8 Then, it can be shown by a similar way to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, that an SCC satisfies Condition μ s r for each r = q, q + 1, . . . , n − 2 if and only if it is Nash-implementable by q-mechanisms. Thus, because of Lemma 1, for each q = 2, . . . , n − 2, an SCC is Nash-implementable by q-mechanisms if and only if it is Nashimplementable.
An alternative characterization
Using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990), we now introduce an alternative condition, labelled Condition M s , to characterize implementability by s-mechanisms. The condition can be stated as follows.
Condition M
s (for short, M s ). An SCC F satisfies M s if there exists a set Z ⊆ X, and for all R ∈ R n and for all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
Instead of the profile ¡ C`¡R −{`+1,...,`+r} , x ¢¢`∈ N introduced in Condition μ s r , the above condition introduces the profile (C * (R`, x))`∈ N which corresponds to the case ¡ C`¡R −{`+1,...,`+r} , x ¢¢`∈ N with r = n − 1. 9 As for the profile ¡ C`¡R −{`+1,...,`+r} , x ¢¢`∈ N we also show that (C * (R`, x))`∈ N is welldefined and can be constructed by using the profile (C`(R, x))`∈ N given in Condition μ. Note that the profile (C * (R`, x))`∈ N is similar to the profile of Condition M devised by Sjöstrom (1991). Finally, we show that Condition M s is equivalent to Condition μ s r . Before stating our next result, it may be worth mentioning here that Condition M s do not include any condition of type of Condition μ s r (iv). For this reason -and in contrast to the proof of Proposition 2-, the proof of sufficiency of Condition M s exploits in full the information coming from the cyclic announcement of strategies. This is done by constructing a mechanism which turn to be different from the one designed in Proposition 2. Note that the next result can be shown without imposing forthrightness.
Theorem 2. An SCC F on R n satisfies M s if and only if it is Nashimplementable by an s-mechanism.
Proof. Since the necessity of Condition M s can be easily obtained by following the proof of the necessity of Condition μ given by Moore and Repullo (1990) we omit it here.
Conversely, suppose that F satisfies Condition M s . We show that F is Nash-implementable via an s-mechanism. For, define the outcome function g as in Proposition 2 where Rule 3 is replaced by the following one: Rule 3 * : For some i ∈ N , m is m −i consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where x ∈ F ¡R¢ , and C * i
The proof follows the same arguments as those provided in the proof of Proposition 2 except for the sub-case 2.2, in which the case x ∈ F ¡R 0 ¢ is considered. Therefore, we provide only the proof of this sub-case while we omit all others here.
Suppose that m ∈ NE (γ, R) and m falls into Rule 2 such that R
Then, i − 1 or i is the deviator. Agent`∈ N\ {i − 1, i} can attain any y ∈ Z\ {x} by inducing Rule 4, so that x ∈ max R`Z as m ∈ NE (γ, R). Consider agent i − 1. Take any y ∈ C * i−1
¢ via Rule 3. In the case that
. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. Let F be an SCC defined on R n . Then, Condition M s is equivalent to Condition μ.
Proof. Let F on R n be an SCC. First, suppose that F satisfies M s . Then, by Theorem 2, F is Nash-implementable by an s-mechanism, and so it is Nash-implementable. By Moore and Repullo (1990)'s result it follows that F satisfies μ. Conversely, suppose that F satisfies μ. Then, F is Nashimplementable. For any`∈ N , R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R), let
For any`∈ N, R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R), define the set C * (R`, x) as follows
We prove that F satisfies M s . Let Z = Y . Moreover, take any R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R). It follows from (3) and μ that, for each`∈ N, x ∈ C
, and so M s (iii) holds. We conclude that F satisfies M s if it satisfies Condition μ.
Form Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 the corollary stated below is readily obtained.
Corollary 3. Let F be an SCC defined on R n . Then, Condition M s is equivalent to Condition μ s .
Characterizing s-Mechanisms as the LowerBound Strategy Space Reduction Mechanisms
The last two sections show that the 'strategy space reduction' from the canonical mechanisms up to s-mechanisms does not make any effect on the class of Nash implementable SCCs. The purpose of this section is to show that such a property can no longer hold if a further step of the 'strategy space reduction' is taken. Indeed, if the self-relevant mechanism defined in Tatamitani (2000) is taken as a further step of the strategy space reduction from s-mechanisms, it can be shown that the class of Nash-implementable SCCs by self-relevant mechanisms is a proper subset of the class of Nash implementable SCCs. However, there is another type of further strategy space reduction that is relevant for the issue at hand. In what follows, we consider a strategy space reduction mechanism in which each agent reveals only her neighbor's preferences in addition to an outcome and an integer (neighbor's preference mechanism, np-mechanism) and examine the cost of using this kind of mechanisms on implementability of SCCs. Definition 4. An SCC F is Nash-implementable by an np-mechanism if there exists an np-mechanism γ = (M, g) such that, for all R ∈ R n : i) F (R) = NA (γ, R); and ii) for all x ∈ F (R), if m`= (R`+ 1 , x, ¦) ∈ M`for all`∈ N, with`+ 1 = 1 if`= n, then m ∈ NE (γ, R) and g (m) = x.
Using the approach developed by Moore and Repullo (1990) , we now introduce a condition, Condition μ np , which turns out to be necessary for SCCs that are implementable by np-mechanisms in the three or more agents case. Before describing the condition and prove its necessity, we need addition nota-
The condition is stated as follows.
Condition μ
np (for short, μ np ): An SCC F satisfies Condition μ np if there exists a set Y ⊆ X, and for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
Proposition 3. An SCC F on R n satisfies Condition μ np if it is Nashimplementable by an np-mechanism.
Proof. Let an SCC F on R n be Nash-implementable by an np-mechanism. Let γ = (M, g) be such an np-mechanism. Define Y ≡ g (M). For all R ∈ R n and x ∈ F (R), there exists an m ∈ NE (γ, R) such that g (m) = x and m`= ¡ R`+ 1 , x, k`¢ for all`∈ N, by Definition 4(ii). Take any`∈ N.
Next, we show that F satisfies Conditions μ
Thus, there is an m * ∈ M such that g (m * ) = y, which implies that y ∈ NA (γ, R * ) = F (R * ). Hence, μ np (iii) holds. Suppose that x / ∈ F (R * ) and D (R * , x) 6 = ∅ and consider the strategy profile m * = ¡ R * +1 , x, k`¢ ∈ M`for all`∈ N. Let p (R * , x) ≡ g (m * ). Consider any i ∈ D (R * , x) and R 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we deal with the informational efficiency issue pertaining to Maskin's Theorem (Maskin, 1999) . We focus on s-mechanisms in which each agent reports to the planner her own preference and her neighbor's preference solely, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an integer. We introduce a class of new conditions, labelled {Condition μ s r } r=1,...,n−2 , each of which fully characterizes the class of SCCs Nash-implemantable by s-mechanisms. Surprisingly, for each r = 1, . . . , n−2, Condition μ s r is equivalent to Condition μ. This has two important implications for Nash implementation. First, the class of Nash-implementable SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs Nashimplementable by s-mechanisms. Second, even though our condition is stated in terms of the existence of certain sets, it can easily be checked in practice by the algorithm provided by Sjöström (1991) .
Note that our results are in line with other well known results of Nash implementation in economic environments. In particular, the equivalent relationship between Nash implementation by s-mechanism and Nash implementation in general social choice environments is analogous to the equivalent relationship between Nash implementation by natural allocation mechanisms and Nash implementation by natural quantity 2 mechanisms (Saijo et al, 1996) . Moreover, Tatamitani (2001) provides a full characterization of Nash implementation by self-relevant mechanisms, which together with Proposition 3 in this paper indicates that any further 'strategy space reduction' from s-mechanisms drastically decreases the class of Nash-implementable SCCs. This is parallel to the case of natural implementation in economic environments, in which the class of SCCs Nash-implementable by natural quantity mechanisms is much smaller than the Nash-implementable ones by natural quantity 2 mechanisms. In contrast, whenever a small departure from the standard framework of implementation theory is considered the above relationship may break down. For example, Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009) introduce the notion of partial honesty in implementation theory and consider Nash implementation problems with partially-honest agents. A partially-honest agent is an agent who has preferences over message profiles and displays concerns for two dimensions in lexicographic order: (1) her outcome and (2) her truthtelling behavior. In the presence of partially honest agents, the equivalent relationship between Nash implementation and Nash implementation by smechanisms no longer holds, as Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011) show. This suggests that the equivalent relationship indispensably relies on the assumption that agents act purely to advance their own self-interest and are not inclined to attach (moral) rights and duties to their actions.
